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Validity Of Denial Of License To Exhibit Motion Picture
Expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech
and free press guaranty of the first and fourteenth amendments.1 The freedom
to exhibit is not an absolute one,2 but its erosion is prevented by limiting the
area of permitted governmmental intervention. This restricted area of encroach-
ment has been further delimited by recent Supreme Court pronouncements which
place curbs upon legislative delegation of wide powers of censorship to admin-
istrative bodies.3 One recognized exception to the general rule of "limited cen-
sorship,"4 is revealed in recent federal and state attempts to control the flow and
dissemination of magazines, and other forms of expression which are, by defini-
tion, obscene. 5 These successful efforts have reaffirmed the widely-held judgment
that obscenity is not within the boundary of constitutionally protected speech.
But, use of the word, obscene, does not by merely attaching it as a label to a form
of expression, rid us of all the dangers to freedom of speech and the press.
One substantial danger to these guaranteed rights lies in the administrative
or judicial determination that a given motion picture, or magazine, is obscene,
even under modern terminology.6 There is no problem where a defendant admits
the obscene nature of his product, but great areas of disagreement, even by the
best of courts, occur when a given standard is applied to a particular film, book,
or photograph. The fundamental problem is perceptively squared by Mr. Justice
Harlan, concurring in Alberts v. California, and dissenting in Roth v. United
States7 when he states that "if obscenity is to be suppressed, the question whether
1. Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
2. Id. at page 497.
3. Gelling v, State of Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952); Superior Film v. Depart-
ment of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1953); Holmby Prods. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870
(1955).
4. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See, comment, 6 BUFFALO L. REv.
305 (1957) for a thorough treatment of subsequent restraints in the area of
obscene literature, and the impact of recent New York statutory law upon the
subject of obscenity.
5. Examples of federal and state statutory enactments can be found in 18
U.S.C. §1461 (federal obscenity statute), and N.Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§22-a (state obscenity statute).
6. The Supreme Court, in the Roth and Alberts decisions, accepted the
following definition(s) of the term, obscene:
. . . whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to prurient interest.., the test in each case is
the effect of the book, picture, or publication considered as a
whole not upon any particular class but upon ... the average
person in the community. -U.S.-, 77 S.Ct. 1311, 1312
(1957).
7. Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California - U.S.- , 77 S.Ct. 1304
(1957). It must be noted that no issue was presented in either case involving the
obscenity of the material involved, since it appears to have been the defendants'
intention to test the constitutionality of both statutes.
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a particular work is of that character involes not really an issue of fact, but a
question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind." The
case of Excelsior Pictures Corporation v. Regents of University,8 which decided
by a bare majority of the Court of Appeals, that the film, "Garden of Eden," was
not subject to prior censorship, presents the problem of film censorship in as
dramatic and forceful manner possible. Arguments of great weight and social
importance are brought forward by the opposing views generated by the mem-
bers of the Court; arguments ranging from the preservation of the constitutional
separation of powers,9 to the need of protecting freedoms of expression where
any general public concern is not evident, or probable.10
Petitioner, Excelsior Pictures Corporation, presented the film "Garden of
Eden" before the acting director of the Motion Picture Division of the State
Education Department, in order to receive the necessary license to exhibit the
movie. The film depicted, in a fictionalised form, the activities of the members of
a nudist group in a secluded private camp in Florida. The director denied peti-
tioner a license, and petitioner requested the Board of Regents to review this
decision. The Board affirmed the denial of the license, and by applying the
provisions of section 1140-b of the Penal Law to the film, found that under the
Education Law," the film was indecent, whereupon, on appeal, the Appellate
Division'= annulled the prior determination and ordered the license granted.
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, affirmed the action of the
appellate court, and suiported the finding that the film was not obscene,'3 as the
court chose to define the term, indecent. 14 The acceptance of this finding is
important in any attempt to understand the reasoning of the majority. The major
premise as put forth by Judge Desmond is that only matter which is obscene can
be subject to censorship. The film "Garden of Eden" is not obscene (indecent),
nor is it made so by applying a penal section involving the wilful exposure of
one's private parts to two or more members of the opposite sex,' 5 where the
8. 3 N.Y.2d 237, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957). Here, petitioner contested the
finding of the Department of Education that the film to be exhibited was indecent
(obscene).
9. 3 N.Y.2d at 249, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 54, 55.
10. Id. at 244, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
11. N.Y. EDUCATION LAw §§122 and 124 require the Board of Regents to
Issue a license unless the film is:
... obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacreligous, or is of
such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt
morals or incite to crime.
22. 2 A.D.2d 941, 156 N.Y.S.2d 800 (3rd Dep't 1957).
13. See note 8 supra, at page 239, 240, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 44, 45.
14. By the application of the maxim noscitur a sociis, the Court limited the
definition of the term, indecent, to mean obscene. Its action had deeper impor-
tance in that it gave to a word, which, standing alone, would be stricken down
as too vague; just as the words, immoral, sacreligous, were rejected by the
Supreme Court. 3 N.Y.2d at 242, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 44, 46, 47.
15. N.Y. PENAL LAW §1140-b, is fully set forth at 3 N.Y.2d 248, 165 N.Y.S.2d
52.
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validity of such statutory application is to be found, neither in the section itself,
nor in the legislative history which surrounded its promulgation.' 0 Therefore,
since the movie in question was not found to be obscene under a reasonable and
sensible reading of the statutes in question, it could not be subjected to any
censorship. In its opinion, the Court also rejected the old Hicklin test of obscenity,
17
in favor of more recent statutory and judicial tests, reaffirmed the use of section
1141 rather than 1140-b of the Penal Law in aiding the Court in its determination
whether a given film was obscene, and concluded its arguments by saying that "in
the present case the Board of Regents . ..went far beyond the permissible
maximum of censorship ... this unlawful exercise of the censorship power must
be overruled by this court."'Is
In a long and wordy dissent, Judge Burke took issue with the majority on
the various points of its opinion. He attacked the definition given the term
"indecent" by the Court,'9 and stated that the term had a clear and understandable
meaning. Also, when read in the light of section 1140-b, the term had a fixed
definition for the purposes of section 122 of the Education Law. The opinion
continued by reviewing the legislative history of section 1140-b, and concluded
that the legislative intent was manifest, and that the section was to be applied
when a film depicting a typical nudist colony, was to be exhibited. 20 The dissent
sharply challenged the role of the majority in its attempt to limit the area of
permissive state intervention, and reiterated the argument that when the legis-
lature has spoken with sufficient clarity, the judiciary must not interpose its own
personal judgment by declaring a particular statutory enactment inapplicable.
2 '
The dissent would thus have upheld the application of section 1140-b to the
Education Law provisions relating to movie licensing,2 2 and would have given the
term, indecent, its own independent significance.
The approach of the majority, seen in the light of the preferred position of
the first amendment freedoms,2 3 would seem the wiser and more acceptable view.
Obscenity, along with criminal libel,2 4 apparently are the only remaining areas of
16. 3 N.Y.2d at 243, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 48. The history of the statute demon-
strates that the legislature had in mind a particular evil which was creating
serious harm to the citizens of the state. It was quickly passed, and from the
lack of case law, just as quickly forgotten, until the present decision.
17. See, Regina v. Hicklin, L.R., 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868), where the test"whether the tendency of the matter... is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication
of this sort may fall," was established.
18. See note 8 supra at page 244, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
19. Excelsior Pictures Corporation v. Regents of University, 3 N.Y.2d 237,
247, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42, 52, 55 (1957).
20. Id. at 254, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 52, 53.
21. See note 19 supra at page 249, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 54, 55.
22. N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § §122, 122-a, 124.
23. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1946); Schnieder v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939).
24. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
permissible governmental penetration where forms of expression are involved.
In line with this view, the majority finds that it is a valid exercise of state power
to prohibit the exhibition of obscene matter, but an attempt to curb expression
by labeling it "indecent," and giving the term its own independent meaning,
would present grave constitutional problems when viewed in the light of Supreme
Court decisions striking down censorship based upon standards as vague and
broad as "indecent."25 The only avenue of interpretation open to the Court of
Appeals would be to interpret the term as it did, thereby giving the word a
meaning found acceptable by the highest court, and at the same time avoiding
any constitutional questions which would arise if the motion picture were to be
denied a license solely on the ground that it was "indecent." The majority also
pointed to the accepted practice of applying section 1141 of the Penal Law to
motion pictures; that is, to enable the Board of Regents to define the terms
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent," when judging a motion picture. Under
section 1141, these terms have been defined and the test has become, obscenity,
and the attempted use of section 1140-b to help the Board of Regents find a
clearer meaning for "indecent," and to give it a meaning different than that
placed under section 1141 cannot be justified. The limited purpose and reach of
section 1140-b was not meant to extend to motion pictures, nor was it even
meant to help define a word as broad as "indecent." The Board of Regents
attempted to stretch the statute beyond the limits of its logic, by what-appears
to be a strained interpretation of the legislative history.
The majority has succeeded in preserving section 122 of the Education Law,
in order to apply it under the proper circumstances to a motion picture which any
reasonable member of the community would say was totally lacking in social
value, and which treated sex in a manner appealing mainly to prurient interest. It
has properly declared that, when forms of expression are to be subjected to censor-
ship, the Court should be the final state arbiter on the delicate constitutional
questions involved when a film is labeled obscene. The Court should not, and-
cannot accept any administrative determination as the final word on the subject.
Police Power-Unlawful Interference With Business
The police power endows the legislature with a wide range of discretion in
the enactment of legislation.26 Ordinarily, if it appears that the object of the legis-
lation in question is to promote the public health, safety, or welfare, and that the
means adopted by the legislature are reasonably calculated to reach this end, the
legislation must be sustained.
2
T
25. See note 3 supra.
26. Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937).
27. People v. Perutta, 253 N.Y. 305, 171 N.E. 72 (1930).
